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As often occurs with coverage of events in Russia, there are several stories 
behind the breaking news. And it is with knowledge of these behind-the-scenes 
details that a clearer picture can emerge. Thus, although the Russian 
government has claimed that recent bombings in Moscow are the result of 
Chechen terrorism, and a bombing campaign launched by Russia against 
Chechnya is designed solely to target terrorist bases, the real story behind 
conflict in the Caucasus and Russia's invasion of Chechnya is quite a bit more 
complicated. 
 
Pressure on the Caucasian states 
Some analysts have feared that Russia would use the troubles in Dagestan and 
Chechnya as an excuse to extend its hold on the states of the Caucasus. During 
the last week alone, Russia has taken several steps in that direction, including: 
 
• A push for the re-manning of former Soviet bases in Azerbaijan and the 
resumption of Russian Border Guard control of the Georgian border with 
Chechnya; 
 
• A warning of the need to increase the Russian presence at the Abkhazia 
military base, in response to rumors that Basaev might spend the winter in 
Svanetia, a neighboring Georgian district. 
 
• The bombing of an Azerbaijani village on October 1 was meant to send a 
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"sort of warning" to the Azeri government Nezavisimaya gazeta reported 
on October 5. 
 
• In a televised interview of October 3, Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign 
Minister, issued another warning by saying that Russian demands should 
not be"brushed aside, because they are not empty statements." In a style 
deeply reminiscent of Soviet parlance, Ivanov took upon himself to 
represent the interests of other states: "Georgia and Azerbaijan should be 
no less interested than Russia in seeing this conflict settled." To that end 
they must enter into the "closest cooperation" with Russia and the CIS. 
 
These moves by Russia have not taken everyone by surprise, as statements by 
government officials have served as red flags. Over the last few weeks, for 
example, the Russians have closed and reopened the borders with Azerbaijan 
and Georgia, claiming (against reason, lack of evidence, and Azeri and Georgian 
protests to the contrary) that arms have been shipped to Chechnya and 
Dagestan through or from these countries. Actually, the entire scenario of 
externally procured arms seems far-fetched, since most of the time Chechens 
buy weapons from Russian soldiers. 
 
Moreover, some Russian publications lately have been identifying the United 
States as the party ultimately responsible for conflict in the Caucasus, claiming 
that the US arms Georgia in order to push the Russian Federation out of the 
region. Thus, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie reports that the US is the cause 
of heightened tensions between Abkhazia and Georgia. The paper completes its 
fanciful scenario with the following end result: "Abkhazia is entirely engulfed and 
NATO builds bases on its territory." 
 
IMF buys the bombs 
International Monetary Fund loans are not targeted at specific programs; thus, 
one cannot point to a structure in Russia and say that IMF money paid for this 
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hospital or that road. Instead, such funds are directed at financing the budget 
deficit, and the IMF pays for whatever is in the budget. It so happens that these 
days, as in 1994 and 1995 when the loans were first approved, the major 
expense is the slaughter of Chechen civilians. In this way the West is implicated 
in Russia's crimes against humanity. In fact, the magnitude of the loans in 1994-
1995 was roughly equal to the cost of the war (Christian Science Monitor, May 
8,1995) 
 
The Moscow Times noted the parallels between IMF funding and the bombing 
campaigns, and has argued that Russia should be held to the same standards of 
responsibility as every other funding recipient. ("Cut All IMF Funding for Putin's 
War," October 5, 1999) As the paper suggested, if Russia is spending hundreds 
of millions of dollars to blast civilians, the logical response is to cut the flow of 
money from the West. "When crimes against humanity like this happen in East 
Timor or Kosovo, Bill Clinton's administration is ready to intervene. There are 
always different rules for Russia, however. And that should change." 
 
That the West feels constrained against complaining too forcefully about Russia's 
latest actions stems in part from a misguided sense that NATO's campaign in 
Kosovo set a precedent for Moscow's current activities. To accept that premise 
would do as much damage to Chechen civilians as sending money to finance the 
bombing campaigns. Though in some basic ways the bombing of Serbia and of 
Chechnya are alike -- in both cases bombs were used to take out important 
elements of the infrastructure, in both cases commanders briefed the press about 
their activities -- the similarities end there. 
 
War is avoidable 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, meanwhile, has been trying desperately 
not to seem radical. Russia has cut off all contact with him. He was thwarted 
even from meeting with the president of Dagestan, Magomedali Magomedov. 
The OSCE has also failed to responding. He repeatedly called for negotiations 
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and on one occasion sought to have Shevardnadze mediate. He has invited 
international observers. Only on the very eve of the ground war, when Russian 
troops had been massed at his borders, did Maskhadov start to make 
antagonistic statements. Throughout the escalating war of words from Moscow 
and the subsequent bombing, he created plenty of room to prevent the war if 
they wanted to do so. Moscow showed no interest in avoiding conflict. 
 
By way of comparison, in 1994 Dudaev spoke in one breath of jihad and of the 
possibility of some sort of autonomy, a la Tatarstan. On the eve of the ground 
war, when tanks were rolling through Ingushetia, Dudaev offered an arrangement 
that would allow for substantive economic, military and diplomatic relations. Even 
in that case Chechnya provided enough face-saving room if the Russians had 
wanted to negotiate. 
 
Opacity of decision making in Moscow 
Other than the argument that it is fighting terrorism, Moscow has not articulated a 
policy or a goal. As in 1994, the process is obscure and it seems that the war is 
actually a way of resolving elements of a political struggle within the leadership. 
 
The defense minister and the prime minister have sent out different signals about 
the possibility of ground war. The prime minister seems to be in control. Where is 
the president in all of this? Back in January of 1997, Yel'tsin sent a message to 
Maskhadov congratulating him on his election as president of Chechnya, and 
said that Russia respects the choice of the Chechen voters. In its negotiations 
with Chechnya, Moscow has treated Maskhadov as the legitimate president. On 
what grounds, and with what authority, does Putin contravene that now? 
 
There is speculation that Maskhadov was working with Stepashin and Rushailo 
to get rid of Basaev and Khattab. When Basaev staged his raid into Dagestan in 
July, Maskhadov called up reinforcements to protect the border. In a recent 
interview Maskhadov indicated that he might have attempted to arrested Basaev 
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if not for the Russian bombing of Dagestani villages. 
 
"Had the Russians not chosen to bombard the Wahhabi villages in the center of 
Dagestan, after Basayev's first retreat, we could perhaps have dealt with them. 
They [Basaev, Khattab, and other radical elements] were discredited, divided. 
But the continued attacks by the Russians reunited them. (...)[I] f tomorrow the 
Russians were to recognize our sovereignty, saying in effect: 'That's it! We are 
no longer interfering in anything. Build anything you want!' -- I would have a free 
hand to deal with the partisans of the grand jihad." (Le Monde (Internet version), 
18 Sep 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0918) 
 
On the one hand Stepashin and Rushailo would use "preventative strikes" 
against the field commanders' detachments; on the other hand, they worked 
towards organizing a meeting between Maskhadov and Yel'tsin. The Chechen 
State Security Minister Turpal-Ali Atgeriev was briefly arrested in July. After his 
release he said that the purpose of detainment had been to humiliate Stepashin. 
Also some have reported that the MVD and the military are in competition. On 6 
July Izvestia reported that the military "openly sabotaged" Stepashin's and 
Rushailo's strategy earlier in the Spring. Now, under the Putin government the 
military command has clearly taken the lead. 
 
It seems that the Stepashin government sought to defeat the militant elements 
while maintaining a dialogue with Maskhadov. That all changed either when the 
financial scandal broke or when Stepashin was replaced by Putin. In any case, 
there was a sharp change in policy when Moscow turned its focus from 
"eliminating" Basaev and Khattab to creating a buffer zone in Chechnya. This 
shift is explained by the bombings that left roughly 300 dead in Moscow, but the 
authorship of those explosions remains obscure. 
 
Moscow bombings 
Setting aside the question of what "Chechen terrorists" would have to gain by 
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exploding bombs in Moscow and turning Russian popular opinion against 
Caucasians, if the Chechen field commanders did set the initial explosions, why 
have they stopped? Why aren't more buildings in Moscow going up in smoke as 
retribution for the bombing of population centers in Chechnya? It's as though the 
"terrorists" achieved their aim by waking the Russian bear. 
 
Conjecture that someone other than the Chechens may have set the explosions 
is bolstered by a recent report that the FSB was in a big rush to bury the crime 
scenes of the Moscow bombings. "The Moscow Times notes in an editorial that 
the Ulitsa Guryanova bombing site was buried just 10 days after the explosion, 
and the Kashirskoye Shosse site was never secured before rubble clearance 
began the day of the blast. 'Is this ignorance?' asks the Times. 'In the capital city 
of a country where the current prime minister, Vladimir Putin, was once its top 
security official, the assumption sells the FSB short. The Federal Security 
Service has the equipment, know-how and political clout required to perform a 
proper investigation.... Few bombing sites are destroyed as quickly as those at 
Ulitsa Guryanova and Kashirskoye Shosse.'" (Russian Reform Monitor, No. 688, 
October 5, 1999) 
 
Military Tactics 
What does the Russian government and military command hope to accomplish? 
Punish the Chechens? Create enough chaos to justify postponing the elections? 
Use the war as a pretext for launching new operations against Georgia and 
Azerbaijan? Maybe all of those -- time will tell. At present, the newly adopted 
tactic appears to be to take the northern lowlands, thereby pushing Chechen 
forces into the mountains where they will presumably freeze or starve to death. 
Would Russia really be content with holding only a portion of Chechnya and 
allowing the Chechen commanders to maintain control of the other part? 
 
In 1995 and 1996 the Chechens were down to holding only one or two mountain 
settlements. That is what prompted Basaev's raid on Budennovsk. When 
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Maskhadov was squeezed to the wall he came out of the mountains and took 
back Grozny on the day that Yel'tsin was sworn in as president. History has 
shown that the Chechens do not starve and freeze -- they have survived in the 
mountains for too long -- they come down and bring the war to Russia. So far, 
Russia has not shown the military preparedness or the will to follow the 
Chechens into the mountains and defeat them there. 
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